In this article, we use an experimental survey design to explore how the tactical choices of social movements affect public opinion about whether the government should negotiate with the movement and the bargains that should be struck once negotiations begin. In doing so, we test competing theories about how we should expect the use of tactics with varying degrees of extremeness-including demonstrations, occupations, and bombings-to influence public opinion. We find that respondents are less likely to think the government should negotiate with organizations that use the tactic of bombing when compared with demonstrations or occupations. However, depending on the outcome variable and baseline category used in the analysis, we find mixed support for whether respondents think organizations that use bombings should receive less once negotiations begin. The results of this article are generally consistent with the theoretical and policy-based arguments centering around how governments should not negotiate with organizations that engage in violent activity commonly associated with terrorist organizations.
Introduction
Some of the most prominent examples of contentious political activity in recent years-over five hundred thousand Catalan demonstrators marching through Barcelona dressed in their region's red and yellow, pro-Russian protesters occupying government buildings in Donetsk, Ukraine, and renewed bombing efforts by the New Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland-capture public attention not only because of their political goals but also because of the tactics the movements choose to employ in pursuit of these goals. 1 Indeed, the combination of the goals of a movement with the tactics it employed has played an important role in determining whether some of the most iconic social movements in history succeeded or failed. For example, innovations in repertoires of contention such as civil rights sit-ins and revolutionary barricades in France have been argued to have shaped the success of the movements that chose to employ them. 2 Moreover, social movements are cognizant of the impact their tactical choices have on both potential government action and public opinion. For instance, in 1980, in Poland during Solidarity's protest in the Lenin Shipyard, the Strike Committee imposed a strict ban on alcohol to ensure discipline and peacefulness of protest. 3 Similarly, Spanish indignados occupying Puerta del Sol in Madrid patrolled the tent city with the goal of preventing violence and vandalism. These actions were taken with the understanding that protest forms incompatible with the movement's nonviolent strategy could negatively affect the public image of the movement and jeopardize future success in achieving its preferred political outcome.
There are two main channels through which public opinion about the tactical choices of social movements can affect whether a movement succeeds or fails. First, public perception of a movement determines how much support it is able to attract. For example, the use of tactics that potential supporters deem unwarranted or unethical can have a negative effect on the ability of an organization to garner support. 4 Second, public opinion has an effect on the strategic behavior of governments in response to protest (Giugni, 1998) . 5 Governments facing a social movement are forced to make a number of decisions including whether to repress the movement, whether to negotiate, and how much to concede if they do bargain. While we recognize that public opinion does not always directly translate into a specific government action, in democratic settings governments must be cognizant of how these decisions will be received by the public and the impact they will have on their future electoral prospects (Giugni, 1998) . 6 In this article, we use an experimental survey design to explore how the tactical choices of social movements affect public opinion about whether the government should negotiate with the movement as well as what bargain should be struck once negotiations begin. As both the decision to negotiate and the outcome of bargaining are publicly observable, the decisions that governments make at each of these stages can have long-term electoral ramifications. This makes democratic governments uniquely susceptible to the influence of public opinion at each of these decision-making stages. Using an experimental design also provides the benefit of allowing us to directly measure the effect of different tactical choices on public opinion while holding constant the goals of the movement and the government they are facing. By doing so, we attempt to address one of the primary concerns about empirical tests in the social movements literature: The effect of the choice of tactics on public opinion is confounded by attributes specific to a particular organization such as the identity of the movement, sympathy for its goals, or the movement's institutional alliances. We also ask respondents to explain their answers. We then analyze these open-ended responses using a Structural Topic Model (STM)-a cutting edge text-analysis tool-to provide descriptive statistics exploring potential mechanisms through which the tactics chosen by protest movements affect public opinion. Doing so allows us to explore the extent to which the theoretical logic driving the hypotheses presented in the following sections permeates the thinking of respondents about the tactical choices of social movements and government action.
In designing the experiment and selecting our location, we take care to avoid situations in which respondents rely on easily accessible frames about prominent tactics or issue areas which might lead respondents to attribute the tactic they are assigned through treatment to a familiar organization. If this occurs systematically, we are no longer able to isolate a tactic-specific effect but instead are measuring a combination of a tactic with respondent frames about the goals of organizations. Given this concern, we vary the movement presented in the vignette between a movement pursuing independence and a movement whose goals are not specified. In addition, we administer our survey experiment in Poland. Doing so allows us to conduct our experiment in a democratic political system in which the government is accountable to the electorate and responsive to public opinion but where respondents are unlikely to rely on easily accessible frames about either the tactic or secession. This is in contrast to places such as the United States, with the recent Occupy movement, and the United Kingdom, with the long history of bombing by the Provisional IRA and currently the New IRA, where respondents likely have strong opinions about what the government should do about organizations adopting the tactics of occupation and bombing, respectively. While both the issue area and the tactical choices are realistic within Polish and European politics, Poland provides a low salience context which mitigates concerns that respondents might systematically associate particular tactics or goals with a specific organization.
The findings of this article are threefold. First, we find that respondents are less likely to think that the government should negotiate with organizations using the tactic of bombing when compared with organizations using occupations or demonstrations. The findings hold at the α = .05 level across three out of four specifications in which we vary the generality of the vignette and the way in which we measure the dependent variable. 7 Second, we find that there is not a significant difference in support for government negotiations with movements employing the tactics of an occupation and demonstration. Similarly, we find that there is not a significant difference in how much respondents think the government should be willing to concede to organizations that use the tactics of an occupation or demonstration once negotiations begin. Finally, we find mixed support for whether respondents think organizations that use bombing as a tactic should receive less once negotiations begin depending on the outcome variable and baseline category used in the analysis.
In general, the structure of this article and the ways in which we analyzed the experimental results are consistent with a previous version of the manuscript that went through the peer-review process results-blind. 8 This means that the article went through the process of being revised and resubmitted, and conditionally accepted, prior to fielding the experiment. Throughout this article, we explicitly detail where the analysis of results is either consistent with or departs from the pre-analysis plan. This article is part of a broader movement in social sciences seeking greater transparency in research. 9 The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we present a theoretical framework that allows us to directly test competing arguments about how we should expect the tactical choices of movements engaging in contentious politics to affect public opinion. We use this framework to derive empirically testable hypotheses. Second, we present an experimental design that we used to identify how the tactics chosen by social movements affect public opinion. We focus on two critical junctures in the strategic decision making of governments-whether to negotiate and how much to concede in bargaining-during which public opinion is likely to be particularly salient to the leaders of democratic governments. Third, we discuss the theoretical and practical considerations that led to our selection of Poland as the location for our experiment as well as how we can expect the results presented in this article to generalize to other locations and issue areas. Fourth, we present our results. In general, the analyses presented in this section are consistent with our pre-analysis plan with the exception of the STM. In the final section, we conclude.
Tactical Choice, Public Opinion, and Government Bargaining
Prior research has identified a number of factors influencing the strategic decision of social movements to select a particular tactic. A range of work has demonstrated how the character of the political and social structure in which movements operate, and availability of resources, plays an important role in determining the tactical repertoires of social movements (Gamson, 1975; Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001) . In contrast, others emphasize cultural over material factors. These authors highlight the importance of congruence between forms of action and the identity of the organization (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004) , as well as the ability of movement leaders to draw on symbols and discursive frames from the culture of the community in which they are embedded (Swidler, 1986) . Finally, another strand of scholarship emphasizes the role of internal organizational structures (Polletta, 2012) and the influence of the process of professionalization and organization-building on the choice of tactics (Piven & Cloward, 1979; Staggenborg, 1988) .
While the internal and external factors influencing the movement's tactical decision have been studied extensively, the effects of these choices on public opinion remain underexplored. In this article, we shift the focus away from the motivations behind the adoption of particular strategies to the impact that they have on whether the public supports the decision to negotiate with the movement and the extent of concessions the government should make once negotiations begin. Building directly on three types of theories explaining how the strategic choices of nonstate actors should affect public opinion during conflict processes, we derive a number of hypotheses which are tested directly in our experiment. The presentation of the three types of theories and derivation of hypotheses is unaltered from the prior version of the manuscript that went through the peer-review process results-blind.
The Benefits of Extremism
The first theory, explored primarily through the study of strikes and urban riots, posits that disruptive and violent tactics increase public support for a movement. This occurs because the use of violent tactics facilitates recognition of a movement as a legitimate claimant to an issue and increases its perceived ability to obtain concessions from the government (Astin, Astin, Bayer, & Bisconti, 1975; Bueno de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007; Gamson, 1975; Giugni, 1998; McAdam, 1983; Pape, 2003; Shorter & Tilly, 1974; Tarrow & Tollefson, 1994) . In doing so, the movement is able to garner more support and increases its probability of success. Similarly, research on civil wars argues that rebel groups that execute more terrorist attacks impose extreme costs on the state and undermine its ability to win the conflict. These costs have been shown to increase the likelihood that the rebel group will be invited to participate in negotiations and will obtain concessions in the bargaining process (Thomas, 2014) . A parallel argument holds that the adoption of violent tactics acts as a costly signal of commitment to the political cause which improves the organization's ability to attract recruits and new sources of funding (Bloom, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007; Pape, 2003) . This reasoning has been used to explain spikes in public support following the incidence of both suicide bombings and terrorist attacks more broadly. While these arguments are drawn from studies of conflict processes across a wide range of organizations and movements, the logic driving them is clear: The public has a preference for more extreme tactics. We derive our first two hypotheses directly from this core intuition.
Hypothesis 1A:
The more extreme the tactic, the more respondents believe that the government should negotiate with the movement. Hypothesis 1B: The more extreme the tactic, the more respondents believe that the government should concede to the movement during negotiations.
The Benefits of Moderation
In contrast, a second theory about the relationship between the tactics of nonstate actors and public opinion asserts that moderation and nonviolence increase public support for the movement. There are a number of reasons this might occur. Shaykhutdinov (2010) asserts that nonviolence provides a moral advantage for the organization and allows the group to garner support without provoking the animosity or distrust fueled by violent conflict. This means that adopting more extreme tactics causes individuals that might otherwise be willing to support the movement to now oppose it. A related argument asserts that nonviolence can be both a moral and pragmatic choice (Sharp, 1973) . That is, movements choose nonviolence because they realize that violence can have negative consequences including diverting attention from grievances, polarizing public opinion, and providing justification for governmental repression. The benefits of nonviolence have also been demonstrated by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) in an analysis of aggregate data on major nonviolent and violent conflicts between nonstate and state actors. They show that nonviolent campaigns tend to be more successful and posit two explanations for this finding. 10 First, nonviolent methods strengthen domestic and international legitimacy. Second, the public perceives violent groups as extremists "beyond accommodation." Thus, moderate strategies work in the group's favor, "enhancing their appeal and facilitating the extraction of concessions through bargaining" (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 9) . Another argument for why more moderate tactics might increase public support for a movement is presented by Abrahms (2012) who shows that the demands of terrorist organizations are not effectively communicated through their violent strategies. Instead, respondents infer radical political ends from extreme tactics which closes the bargaining space even where one could exist (Abrahms, 2012) . In addition, the use of extreme tactics decreases the credibility of the terrorist organization's promise to demobilize if concessions are granted (Abrahms, 2013) , which would likely decrease public support for negotiations. Based on these theories, we derive a set of alternative hypotheses in direct contrast to Hypotheses 1A and 1B.
Hypothesis 2A: The more extreme the tactic, the less respondents believe that the government should negotiate with the movement. Hypothesis 2B: The more extreme the tactic, the less respondents believe that the government should concede to the movement during negotiations.
The No Concessions Policy
The third theory about how the tactics chosen by nonstate actors affect public opinion builds on the idea that governments should adopt a strict policy of "no concessions" when negotiating with terrorist organizations. This theory is driven by the claim that giving in to the demands of groups that adopt the most extreme tactics proves this type of violence to be effective and encourages its use in the future (Chellaney, 2006; Clutterbuck, 1992; Netanyahu, 1986) . In this article, we explore whether this idea, pervasive throughout the academic and policy worlds, is also supported by public opinion about social movements that adopt extreme tactics often associated with terrorist organizations. 11
Hypothesis 3A: When organizations adopt bombing as a tactic, respondents are less likely to believe that the government should negotiate with the movement relative to other possible tactics. Hypothesis 3B: When organizations adopt bombing as a tactic, respondents are less likely to believe that the government should make concessions to the movement during negotiation relative to other possible tactics.
Experimental Design
In this section, we present an experimental design intended to test the hypotheses presented in the previous section. In the experiment, respondents are asked to read a vignette describing a social movement that is either pursuing regional independence or does not have a specified goal. 12 We manipulate two factors separately, giving us a 2 × 3 fully factorial design. In the vignette, we randomize (a) whether the goals of the organization (regional independence) are specified and (b) the tactics employed by the organization. Strategies appearing in the vignette are a demonstration, an occupation, and a bombing. The experimental design presented in the remainder of this section is the design proposed in the version of the manuscript that went through the peer-review process results-blind. 13 We chose social movements pursuing regional independence for the following reasons. First, independence movements are active in democratic settings. Unlike revolutionary movements whose goals are often to overthrow a nondemocratic regime, the success of independence movements often hinges on their ability to pressure the government by attracting public support. Indeed, the importance of public support is embodied in the referendum processes-such as the vote following the negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland-that are often used to approve the bargains struck in negotiations between the movement and government. Second, independence movements use a wide range of tactics. This means that our treatment categories, from demonstrating in the streets to bombings, could all plausibly be employed in pursuit of the objectives of the organization. This is important as it allows us to hold constant the issue area for which the movement is fighting while ensuring that the scenario specified in the vignette is plausible. Third, unlike in cases of civil rights or abortion policy, independence is an issue for which individuals are unlikely to hold strong prior believes about the policy that should be implemented. This creates greater space for treatment effects to emerge as the bargains that can be struck, such as full independence or regional autonomy, are not as strongly shaped by the stances respondents already have on the issue. This occurs because the outcomes of independence movements, while topical and salient, are neither a partisan issue nor considered a basic human right in contemporary society. To summarize, in selecting the type of movement to use in our experiment, we searched for a movement that (a) operates in democratic settings, (b) could plausibly employ a variety of tactics in pursuit of its objectives, and (c) advocates for an issue that is salient but about which respondents are unlikely to hold strong beliefs prior to observing the organization's tactical choice.
While our main interest throughout this article is in tactical variation, randomizing between a vignette that specifies an organization pursuing independence and a more general vignette allows us to address two important potential concerns with our design. First, the inclusion of a condition with an organization with a specific goal is intended to assuage the concern that a more generalized vignette invites personal associations beyond researchers' control. In other words, when presented with a generalized vignette, respondents might rely on easily accessible frames and attribute the tactic they are assigned through treatment to a familiar organization that is fighting within a particular issue area. If this occurs systematically, we are no longer able to isolate a tactic-specific effect but instead are measuring a combination of a tactic with respondent frames about the goals of organizations. Indeed, our selection of Poland as the country in which to conduct the experiment is driven in part by our efforts to address this potential problem. The second concern is that the decision to focus on separatist movements limits the external validity of our experiment. While we still face the limitations on external validity common to most experimental studies, 14 presenting a generalized vignette allows us to make inferences more broadly than for only organizations pursuing independence. By randomizing between a general vignette and one that specifies an organization pursuing independence, we are able to address both these concerns in a way that directly tests the robustness of our findings.
In our randomization scheme, we allocate three quarters (approximately 1,500 respondents) to the vignette discussing a separatist organization and the other quarter (approximately 500 respondents) to the general vignette. We do this for two reasons. First, in the general vignette, we are only able to ask the question about whether the government should negotiate with the movement. As defining the goals of the organization is essential in asking about whether the government should make more or less concessions during negotiations, we are unable to ask these types of questions without providing additional information about the goals of the movement. Thus, respondents in the general movement category are only asked whether or not they think the government should be willing to negotiate with the organization. The second reason we divide the sample in this way is to increase power in the treatment category with the movement pursuing independence creating a larger space to allow treatment effects to emerge.
We chose the tactics of demonstration, occupation, and bombing for the following reasons. First, each of these tactics has been used in recent years by movements actively pursuing independence. Indeed, in 2014, there were marches and rallies for independence in Scotland and Spain, occupations of government buildings by pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk, Ukraine, and attempted bombings by the New IRA in Northern Ireland. Second, each of these tactics involves a premeditated strategic choice by a movement rather than an action that arose spontaneously as a situation escalated. For this reason, we chose not to explore a range of violent activities, such as throwing Molotov cocktails, damaging property, and rioting. This allows us to directly explore our primary interest in how the tactical choices made by social movements affect public opinion. Third, demonstrations are used as a baseline tactic. Demonstrations are one of the most common forms of contentious political activity in democracies and, if registered with the authorities, they are legal. This provides a useful baseline that allows us to directly compare a common choice of movements against the more extreme tactics of occupation and bombing. Finally, the three tactics form a clear scale of extremeness, allowing us to adjudicate between hypotheses about the benefits of extremeness, benefits of moderation, and no concessions. 15 To prevent idiosyncratic features of the vignette from driving the results, we also randomly vary the contextual variable of whether the movement's activity takes place in a foreign country. 16 This is intended to address concerns that respondents' perceptions about whether the experiment is occurring in Poland might vary with treatment status. For example, respondents might be more likely to believe that the experiment is occurring in Poland if they receive the treatment with the tactic of demonstration than the treatment of bombing. This becomes a problem if differential association about whether the movement is operating in Poland also sparks feelings of domestic pride or nationalism that also affect the willingness of respondents to think the government should negotiate or make concessions. Thus, we randomly inform half the participants that the movement is in a foreign country and for the other half do not specify the location.
Another possible concern about the vignette is that we do not directly specify how the tactic that is chosen relates to prior interaction between the government and social movement. For example, a movement might have tried a range of institutionalized and legal tactics and only resorted to bombing after failing to achieve its outcome through alternative means. We view an exploration of the influence of context and timing of the protest activity on public opinion as an exciting opportunity for future research. The vignette and experimental design presented here are intended to provide a foundation for exploring the links between tactical choices of social movements and public opinion and thus provide the most concise and direct test of the specified hypotheses possible.
To summarize, the vignette provides details about a movement pursuing independence and a generalized group with no details about their goals. Fixing the goals of the movement allows us to focus on groups operating in a democratic setting that could plausibly employ a variety of tactics in pursuit of their objectives. Moreover, the use of the goal of independence allows us to focus on a salient issue for which public opinion clearly matters but where respondents likely do not hold a strong prior belief about what the government should do. Finally, we randomize between three tactical choices that have each been employed in recent years including demonstrations, occupations, and bombings. The vignette is as follows: After reading the vignette, respondents are asked several questions designed to test the hypotheses presented in this article. In the questions, we make a distinction between the two major decisions governments are forced to make when faced with a challenging social movement: whether to negotiate and what concessions should be made once negotiations begin. This distinction mirrors the two stages of the bargaining process that governments and social movements could plausibly engage in. The first question, which focuses on whether respondents think the government should negotiate, is a direct test of Hypotheses 1A, 2A, and 3A. These hypotheses present competing claims about how the tactical choices of social movements affect whether respondents should be more or less likely to think the government should negotiate with the movement. Respondents are asked the following: Do you think that the government should negotiate with the movement?
Following the first question, we utilize a conditional branching format to measure how strongly respondents feel about whether the government should negotiate with the movement. This provides us with a more fine-grained measure of how the tactical choices of the movement affect the strength of opinion about whether respondents think the government should negotiate with the movement. We use the results of this question to create a 4-point scale varying from respondents feeling very strongly that the government should negotiate to feeling very strongly that the government should not negotiate with the movement. The follow-up question asks as follows: The fourth and fifth questions directly test Hypothesis 1B, 2B, and 3B. In both of them, we explore how variation in the extremeness of the tactic employed by the social movement affects public opinion about the extent of concessions the government should make to the movement once negotiations have begun. The fourth question asks what the government should be willing to concede to the movement during negotiations with the options being either independence for the region, regional autonomy, or no concessions. For each of the options, we provide a brief description alongside the answer detailing what each outcome entails. We chose regional autonomy and independence for the region because these are some of the most common outcomes of separatist movements. Examples of regional autonomy following negotiations have occurred in Northern Ireland and Bangsamoro in the southern Philippines. 19 Examples of independence following separatist movements have occurred in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, each voting for the establishment of a democratic republic independent of the Soviet Union. Finally, we allow for the option of no regional autonomy because even if this is not a feasible bargain for the government to strike within negotiations, it is possible that respondents still support solutions outside of the bargaining range. Incorporating the option of no regional autonomy gives participants the option of disagreeing with the government, and thus either pressuring the government not to concede or shifting the bargains that the government is able to accept. To assess how variation in tactical extremeness affects public opinion about the concessions, the government should make during negotiations we ask respondents the following question: While the above question is motivated by some of the most frequent resolutions to separatist movements it is a relatively coarse measure. The structure of the dependent variable might not allow enough space for treatment effects to emerge as respondents are forced into one of the three categories. This means that we might be unable to detect more subtle but nonetheless important differences between the tactical choices of a movement and their effect on public opinion about what the government should be willing to concede during negotiations. For example, it might be that respondents think that the government should be willing to concede more or less during bargaining but these concessions should all be made within the framework of a regional autonomy agreement. To address this possibility, we present respondents with an additional vignette and then ask a question that utilizes a continuous dependent variable.
In particular, the vignette provides information that the government and movement have settled on regional autonomy for the area under dispute. However, as part of the settlement, the two sides must still determine the extent of regional fiscal autonomy. We focus on fiscal autonomy for the continuous outcome as it is both a contentious and important component of negotiations over the devolution of power in Europe. The extent of fiscal autonomy a region should be granted has featured in debates in a diverse range of regions including Catalonia, Northern Italy, Bavaria, and Flanders. Financial themes also feature prominently in the politics of regional autonomy movements. In Belgium, the Flemish movement perceives the financial transfers between regions as draining its resources. Similarly, in Spain, Catalonia wants to reduce its contribution to a national system that redistributes portions of tax revenue to poorer regions of Spain.
The vignette used in our experiment builds directly on the negotiations between the Spanish government and regional representatives in Spain and focuses on the proportion of shared taxes that should be granted to the regions. 20 In particular, in the vignette, we present a simplified version of the negotiations that occurred in Spain in which the movement proposes that 100% of regional income taxes stay in the region while the government proposes that 50% should stay in the region and 50% should go to the central government. 21 The government's proposal of 50% mirrors the actual bargain struck by the Spanish government with the autonomous regions in Spain, while the movement's preferred outcome is full fiscal autonomy. This bargaining range has important advantages in that it is continuous and respondents are unlikely to hold strong prior beliefs about what types of fiscal autonomy arrangements should be struck during negotiations. As in the previous question, while the government proposes 50%, we allow respondents to enter any response from 0% to 100% to allow respondents to disagree with the government's decision to negotiate with the movement. The structure of the dependent variable allows us to construct a finer measure of how the tactical choices of movements affect the concessions respondents think the government should be willing to make during bargaining with the movement using a dependent variable that is both plausible and salient throughout Europe. Respondents are presented with the following additional information:
The government and the separatist movement have settled on regional autonomy for the area under dispute. As part of the settlement they must determine the extent of regional fiscal autonomy. The movement is proposing that 100% of regional income taxes stay in the region while the government is proposing that 50% should stay in the region and 50% should go to the central government.
After being presented with this additional information, respondents are asked the following question:
What percentage of regional income tax revenues do you think should stay in the region?
[Sliding scale from 0% to 100%].
Case Selection
We used the following criteria in determining that our experiment should be conducted in Poland. The ideal country is one in which respondents do not systematically associate a particular tactic with a specific movement which has already obtained concessions from the government. As we seek to avoid situations in which respondents rely on easily accessible frames and attribute the tactic they are assigned through treatment to a familiar organization, it is important that in the selected country, there are no prominent movements currently using that tactic. This means that places such as the United States, with the recent Occupy movement, and the United Kingdom, with the long history of bombing by the Provisional IRA and currently the New IRA, would not be ideal as respondents would likely have strong opinions about what the government should do about movements adopting the tactics of occupation and bombing, respectively. In these cases, we are no longer able to isolate a tactic-specific effect but instead are measuring a combination of a tactic with respondent opinions about the particular movement or organization with which they associate the tactic. For the same reason, we avoid conducting our experiment in places with a long history of separatist activity. This means that places such as Spain, with the prominent Basque National Liberation Movement, would also not be an ideal location. This is not to say that the tactics chosen by organizations within these countries do not affect public opinion. Indeed, we contend that they almost certainty do. Rather, in selecting the country in which to conduct the experiment, we are seeking a location in which the emergence of movements employing a range of tactics is plausible but respondents are unlikely to systematically associate a particular tactic with a specific movement.
In contrast to the United States, United Kingdom, and Spain, respondents in Poland are unlikely to hold strong associations of tactics with a particular organization. The population has also not been polarized over the issue area through highly contentious referenda like it has in the United Kingdom over Scotland or in Spain over Catalonia and is unlikely to have preconceived notions of the extent of autonomy that should be granted to regions with distinct cultural and linguistic heritage. Similarly, unlike countries in Southern Europe, Poland has not experienced the recent wave of anti-austerity protests or occupy movements, which alleviates the concern that fresh awareness of a massive mobilization incorporating a sizable proportion of the population and a large number of organizations with wide-ranging goals would strongly shape the beliefs of respondents about what the government should do. Though mostly ethnically homogeneous, Poland does have two minor autonomy movements: a Silesian Autonomy Movement and Kaszebsko Jednota. Both of these movements are small 22 and minor in the political scene. 23 Given this, we argue that most Poles are unlikely to hold strong prior beliefs about governmental policies toward secessionist movements.
Despite the fact that respondents in Poland are unlikely to hold strong associations between a particular tactic and a specific organization, Poland contains a population cognizant of protest activity. Contentious politics in Poland has been characterized by large variation in the tactics employed by protest groups as well as the types of political and economic goals pursued. For example, the massive Solidarity protest wave, which swept through the country in the 1980s mobilized millions of Poles, exposing them to a range of protest strategies (Ash, 1999) . In the years following the transition to democracy, many Poles chose to articulate their concerns and express their opposition to policy decisions through disruptive actions in the streets (Ekiert & Kubik, 2001 ). Large protest waves engulfed the country again in the late 1990s during the implementation of reforms of the budget sector and leading up to the accession to the EU in 2004. More recent protests have surrounded legislative and social debates, including the role of religious and ideological symbols in public space, abortion, and environmental issues. Demonstrations take place frequently and trade unions have remained active as organizers of strikes and other contentious activities next to new social movement organizations and single-issue groups. Historical and contemporary forms of protest have ranged from petitions, demonstrations, strikes, occupations, road and rails blockades to destroying property, and clashes with the police.
To field the survey, we partnered with the Polish branch of Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS) Global, a company, which merged with Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej (OBOP), one of the oldest public opinion survey groups in Poland and in the region. The survey was administered to a nationally representative sample of approximately 2,000 Polish adults. Respondents were sampled using random-quota sampling. 24 The interviews were computerassisted personal interviews, conducted in person by TNS interviewers with the use of mobile computers instead of pen-and-paper questionnaires.
The structure of the experiment in conjunction with the selection of Poland has important implications for external validity. Throughout the design of the project, we attempted to focus on an issue area that is important but has relatively low salience in Poland. This was done in an effort to prevent respondents from associating the tactic they read about in the vignette with a particular organization which could then influence their opinion about the bargaining process with the government. However, this decision also has important implications for the generalizability of our experiment. Because we designed our experiment to be in a location, where an issue is important but respondents do not have a strong prior about the movement type or its goals, we should be able to generalize to equivalent contexts for a host of different social movements. This means that our findings are likely to be most relevant when we observe either nascent organizations or issue areas on which the public does not have consolidated views. Given that a wide range of social movements emerging around the world are making similar tactical choices, we hope to provide a framework from which researchers can continue to explore how the tactical choices of both violent and nonviolent movements affect public opinion about their organization and goals.
Results
In this section, we present and interpret the results of the experiment as specified in our pre-analysis plan. In doing so, we seek to explicitly detail where our analyses are either consistent with or depart from the pre-analysis plan. The results of the experiment are generally consistent with Hypothesis 3A. That is, for the question asking whether respondents think the government should negotiate with the movement, there is a negative and statistically significant difference between an occupation and a bombing and not a statistically significant difference between a demonstration and an occupation. We find tentative support for Hypothesis 3B-that is, whether respondents think organizations that use bombing as a tactic should receive less once negotiations begin-depending on the outcome variable and baseline category used in the analysis. The remainder of this section presents the findings for each of the questions in turn. Figure 1 presents the results for the question asking whether the government should negotiate with the movement. Consistent with our pre-analysis plan, responses to the first question were analyzed by comparing each tactic against the less extreme category. That is, we compared the tactic of demonstrating against occupying, and occupying against bombing. This yielded two difference-in-proportions estimates where positive values indicate that the more extreme tactic caused an increase in support for negotiations with the movement. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 3A in which there is a statistically significant difference between an occupation and a bombing and not a statistically significant difference between a demonstration and an occupation. The use of the tactic of bombing by separatist organizations decreases support for the government entering negotiations by 6.5% from a baseline of 57.4%. This difference becomes even starker when comparing the results for the more general vignette which provides information about a social movement without specifying the goals of the organization. The use of the tactic of bombing by a social movement decreases support for the government entering negotiations by 28% from a baseline of 70.1%. In contrast, there is not a statistically significant difference in the responses for individuals reading about social movements using occupations as a tactic when compared with the baseline category of demonstrations. 25 Figure 2 presents the results for the follow-up branching question asking respondents how strongly they feel about whether the government should negotiate with the movement. The results of this question were used to create a 4-point scale varying from respondents feeling very strongly that the government should negotiate to feeling very strongly that the government should not negotiate and subsequently analyzed by comparing each tactic against the less extreme category. As was specified in our pre-analysis plan, estimates were obtained using regression where positive values indicate that the more extreme tactic caused an increase in the strength of the belief that the government should negotiate with the movement. Results comparing bombing with occupations are statistically significant at α = .05 for social movements. However, for separatist organizations, the results are not statistically significant at α = .05 though they are at the α = .1 level.
To summarize, the results for the first two outcome questions are generally consistent with Hypothesis 3A in which we expect a statistically significant difference between organizations that use bombings when compared with occupations, paired with a null finding when comparing organizations using occupations relative to demonstrations. The findings hold at the α = .05 across three out of four of the model specifications discussed in our preanalysis plan. Figure 3 presents the results for the question asking respondents what bargain the government should strike with the movement, with options ranging from no regional autonomy to regional autonomy and full independence. The results are statistically indistinguishable across all treatment categories. That is, there is not a statistically significant difference between what respondents think the government should be willing to concede in negotiations when comparing organizations using the tactics of bombings and occupations, and occupations and demonstrations. However, as discussed in the "Experimental Design" section, this type of finding was possible due to the coarse nature of the dependent variable. That is, forcing respondents into one of these three categories might make it so that we are unable to detect more subtle but nonetheless important differences between the tactical choices of a movement and their effect on public opinion about acceptable bargains. We attempted to directly address the possibility that this would occur in the results-blind version of our manuscript. Figure 4 presents the results of a question in which respondents were asked about the extent of tax concessions the government should make to the region during negotiations over the terms of the region's fiscal autonomy. When the results The top panel shows the marginal effect for organizations that use occupations with demonstrations as the baseline category while the bottom panel shows the marginal effect for organizations that use bombings with occupations as the baseline category. We fail to reject the null hypothesis at the α = .05 level (though results are statistically significant at the α = .1 level).
are analyzed in accordance with our pre-analysis plan-comparing bombing against an occupation and testing for statistical significance at the α = .05 level-we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the tactics of occupation and bombing.
Interestingly, the results would have been statistically significant had we specified our pre-analysis plan in one of two slightly different ways. First, if we had instead specified that we would be conducting significance tests at the α = .1 rather than the α = .05 level, the results would be statistically significant. In particular, when comparing the tactic of occupation against bombing we obtain a p value of .088. Second, if we had set the baseline category to be a demonstration, rather than an occupation, the results would have been statistically significant at the α = .05 level with a p value .028. Figure 5 presents the marginal effect of a bombing using demonstrations as the baseline category.
The results of the open-ended question, which asked respondents to explain why they thought the government should or should not negotiate, were analyzed using a STM. 26 A STM is an unsupervised topic model that builds directly on the Latent Dirichlet Allocation model. 27 In these types of unsupervised learning models, topics are inferred by the model rather than assumed before the analysis. 28 In STM, a document is represented as a mixture of topics where each word within a given document belongs exactly to one topic. Each document can then be represented as a vector of proportions that denote the fraction of words in that document that belong to each topic. The results are now statistically significant at the α = .05 level.
The STM innovates on previous unsupervised topic models by allowing for the inclusion of covariates of interest-such as whether respondents read about an organization using the tactic of a bombing-into the priors for the document-topic proportions and topic-word distributions. Each open-ended response is a mixture of topics where the researchers can incorporate relevant covariates where they might expect variation in the proportion of topics. Analysts can subsequently examine differences across included covariates. In the context of a survey experiment, the STM can be used to estimate the effect of a treatment embedded within the survey on text written by survey subjects.
Unlike in prior models, in the STM topic proportions (θ) can be correlated. The prevalence of the topics can be influenced by some set of covariates X through a standard regression model with covariates where θ γ  LogisticNormal ( , X Σ). In this article, these covariates include the treatment status to which respondents were assigned, either a demonstration, occupation, or bombing, and we use the STM to explore how responses change for each of the relevant treatment classes. For each word ( w ) in the open-ended response, a topic ( z ) is drawn from the response-specific distribution. Conditional on that topic, a word is chosen from a multinomial distribution over words parameterized by β. β is formed by deviations from the baseline word frequencies ( m ) in log space ( exp( )) β k k m k ∝ + . To summarize, the STM allows each document to have its own prior distribution over topics defined by relevant covariates of interest to the researcher. This is in contrast to other mixed-membership models, such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), which do not incorporate relevant covariates and instead share a global mean. The use of these covariates allows researchers to build relevant covariates directly into the model and make better inferences about relevant quantities of interest. It is important to note that while we stated that we would analyze the results of the open-ended questions using a STM in the pre-analysis plan, we did not specify the details of its implementation. This was necessary given the need to substantively interpret the output of the STM to determine the number of topics in the analysis as well as the labels that would be applied to each topic.
As discussed in the pre-analysis plan, the goal of the STM analysis is to allow us to explore the extent to which the theoretical logic driving the hypotheses permeates the thinking of respondents. Given the finding that respondents are less likely to think the government should negotiate with movements that choose bombing as a strategy when compared with demonstrations or occupations, we focus on exploring what theoretically separates bombing from other less extreme tactics. Thus, in estimating the STM we compare responses for individuals that read about movements that use the tactic of bombing against the responses of individuals that read about movements using tactics of demonstration and occupation pooled together as the baseline category. 29 Doing so allows us to explore why respondents that read about movements employing the tactic of bombing are less likely to think that the government should negotiate. Prior to analysis, we used standard text preprocessing conventions such as removal of punctuation, numbers, and stopwords. 30 No other covariates were included in the analysis. 31 The model was run with three topics. 32 Figure 6 summarizes each of the three topics with the English translation of the top 20 most probable and exclusive words. 33, 34 We inferred the following topic labels from these words: "Terrorism," "Negotiation and Agreement," and "Citizen's Voice." 35 The first topic is characterized by words such as terrorists, security, and separatists. An exemplar response states as follows: "Because one cannot negotiate with criminals," expressing the resistance to entering dialogue with movements using violent means. The second topic conveys a more conciliatory attitude with top words such as agreement, reach, compromise, and peace. A response with the highest proportion of words drawn from the topic begins with "negotiations are better than war." Finally, words associated with the third topic seem to stress citizenry including words such as voice, rights, democracy, and autonomy. An exemplar response from the third topic states that "The government should listen to people's opinion."
Whether respondents read about an organization using the tactic of a bombing also affected topic prevalence in their written responses. presents difference-in-means estimates with 95% confidence intervals for the effect of reading about an organization using the tactic of bombing on the proportion of response dedicated to Topics 1, 2, and 3. For example, on average, reading about a movement that adopted bombing in pursuit of its goals increased the proportion of response discussing the topic we labeled "Terrorism" by 8%.
In general, the results of the STM are consistent with the logic behind Hypotheses 3A and 3B, which was derived from the logic that governments should adopt a strict policy of "no concessions" when negotiating with terrorist organizations. Respondents that read about movements using bombing as a tactic were more likely to provide responses with high proportions of words associated with conflict and terrorism. Considering that the words terrorists or terrorism were never used in the survey, their emergence in the topic model provides an insight into the mechanism driving the results we observe. In particular, organizations that use bombing as a tactic are more likely to be inferred to be terrorists, and respondents are subsequently less likely to think that the government should negotiate with terrorist organizations. Further research could explore whether this finding holds across a range of violent tactics or whether there is something unique about the use of bombings that invokes the idea that the movement is a terrorist organization.
Conclusion
In this article, we use a survey experiment conducted in Poland to explore how the tactical choices of social movements affect public opinion about whether the government should negotiate with the movement as well as the bargain that should be struck once negotiations begin. The use of an experimental design makes an empirical contribution to a field that has relied mainly on observational and qualitative data. Our results show that public support decreases for both separatist organizations and social movements that adopt bombing as a tactic when compared against occupations and demonstrations.
The analysis of open-ended responses with a STM demonstrates that an important mechanism through which this occurs is the association of extreme strategies with terrorism. This article also contributes to a long-standing debate in both academic and policy worlds on the benefits of nonviolent action by nonstate actors during conflict processes by showing that the public is less likely to be sympathetic to dialogue with organizations adopting the most extreme tactics in pursuit of their goals.
The results of this article by no means invalidate the strains of research from which we derived Hypotheses 1 and 2 but rather point to the need for both further theoretical and empirical research specifying the conditions under which we might expect more extreme tactics to have heterogeneous effects among different segments of the public as well as how we think about tactics on the border between moderate and extreme. For the first category of research, which focuses on how higher levels of violence lead to increases in support, it is possible that these increases are occurring within a small subset of the population that was perhaps already in favor of either the organization or their cause. This points toward the need for future research exploring how the organization's target pool of supporters feeds back into its tactical choices. For example, if individuals more tolerant of violent tactics comprise a minority of the pool of potential supporters, then organizations face a trade-off between becoming the legitimate claimant to an issue among a smaller subset of the population and a decrease in support among the population as a whole.
For the second category of research, which focuses on how more moderate tactics lead to increases in support, it could be that rather than conceptualizing the tactics of movements as falling along a scale of extremeness as done in this paper, tactics are instead thought of as either being extreme, or not. Thus, the findings of this article are actually consistent with this second category because occupations are not extreme enough to garner the negative response that we observe for bombings. We agree this might be the case, and think that this points to the need for further research exploring how the public responds to different potential tactics operating along the potential border between moderate and extreme. That is, if occupations are not extreme enough to garner the negative response associated with bombings, what tactics are? We view answering this question, as well as further exploration of how the strategic choices of social movements affect public opinion, as interesting and exciting areas of further research. Figure A1 shows that there are heterogeneous treatment effects depending on whether we specify the bombing to have occurred in a foreign country. When we do not specify the location of the bombing, respondents are significantly less likely to think that the government should enter negotiations with the government. In contrast, when we specify that the bombing occurred in a foreign country, there is not a significant difference in whether respondents think the government should negotiate with organizations using bombings when compared with occupations. Indeed, we only observe a 2.8% associated decrease in support for negotiations from a baseline of 57%. This is in marked contrast to the 10.5% decrease when the location is unspecified. We leave further theorizing of how the public views violent and separatist movements in locations within and external to their own country as an interesting area of further research. Figure A1 . Heterogeneous treatment effects depending on whether the vignette specified that the separatist movement occurred in a foreign country.
The Location of the Incident: Foreign or Domestic
The results demonstrate that while there is a significant different between occupations and bombings when the location of the incident is unspecified, this effect goes away when the incident is specified to have occurred in a foreign country.
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Notes
1. This view has been pervasive throughout the academic literature. For example, sociologists Taylor and Van Dyke (2004) state that "the tactics of protest used by social movements are so integral to popular views of social movements that sometimes a movement is remembered more for its tactics than for its goals" (p. 263). 2. For an account of how factors within the control of a movement affect the probability of success, see Gamson (1975) . For a discussion of the impact of revolutionary barricades in the Age of Revolution in France, see Traugott (1993 Traugott ( , 2010 . For a discussion of the importance of tactical innovation in increasing the bargaining leverage of the civil rights movement, see McAdam (1983) . 3. For a discussion of the decision to ban alcohol and a more thorough account of events during Solidarity's mobilization, see Ash (1999) . 4. This was clearly demonstrated when public support swung dramatically against the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) after the bombing of Omagh in Northern Ireland. The bombing caused outrage and shock throughout both Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland and reaffirmed their commitment to peace negotiations. For a detailed discussion of the impact of the Omagh bombing, see Dingley (2001) . 5. For how domestic politics constrains government actions in international diplomacy, see Putnam (1988) . 6. A number of authors have shown how public opinion impacts legislative change.
See, for example, Burstein (1979) , Burstein and Freudenburg (1978) , Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987) . Weeks (2008) argues that even nondemocratic leaders can be held accountable by domestic audience. An interesting area of further research would be to explore how the tactical choices of social movements affect public opinion in nondemocratic regimes. 7. When we measure how strongly respondents feel about whether the government should negotiate with a separatist movement, which is a slightly different outcome variable than our main quantity of interest, this finding is not statistically significant at the α = .05 level. 8. The results-blind version of the manuscript can be found on the Experiments in Governance and Politics website: http://egap.org/registration/1257 9. For a broader discussion of the benefits and costs of a results-blind peer-review process, see Findley, Jensen, Malesky, and Pepinsky (2016) . For other articles that have gone through the peer-review process results-blind, see Bush, Erlich, Prather, and Zeira (2016); Hidalgo, Canello, and Lima-de-Oliveira (2016) . 10. This issue is explored in even greater detail in their book length project Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) . 11. It is important to note that throughout this article, we focus on the use of the tactic of bombing rather than whether a given movement is deemed a "terrorist organization." For a discussion of the evolution of the definition of terrorism, see Schmid and Jongman (1984) . 12. Before being presented with the experimental portion of the survey, respondents are asked a number of standard questions about their background. 13. It should be noted that there were significant changes to the experimental design between the initial version of the manuscript and the final version that was conditionally accepted. An important advantage of going through the peer-review process prior to fielding the experiment is that it allows the researcher to make substantial revisions at the design stage, unlike in the standard peer-review process, which takes place after data collection and analysis have already been finalized. 14. These concerns generally focus on whether and how respondents in the sample generalize to other populations. 15. As we discuss in the conclusion, rather than creating a scale of extremeness as we do in this article, further research could explore how the tactical choice between violent and nonviolent tactics affects public opinion. Pursuing this question would involve increasing the number of treatment categories by including both more violent and more nonviolent tactics. 16. The approach used in this article is consistent with how prior research deals with potentially idiosyncratic features of vignettes. See, for example, Tomz (2007) . 17. Whether this sentence says "should" or "should not" varies to match the respondent's answer to the previous question. 18. The wording used to ask respondents to explain their answer in a few sentences is consistent with prior research exploring potential mechanisms through openended survey questions (Tomz, 2007) .
The Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro is a peace agreement signed in
March 2014 between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The agreement establishes an autonomous Bangsamoro. 20. In particular, we model the structure of the bargaining process for the extent of fiscal tax autonomy after the 2009 Spanish arrangement with the autonomous communities, which increased the share of the national pool of personal income tax revenues assigned to the regions from 33% to 50% (Blöchliger & Vammalle, 2012; Boletin Oficial del Estado. ley 22/2009 , 2009 ). 21. In Spain, taxes levied in all regions are collected into a common pool and then shared between the central government and the autonomous communities. The recent agreement is a result of negotiations over a range of fiscal and financial matters, but for the purposes of the experiment, we focus on the aspect most useful for our theoretical question of interest and simplify it to mimic political rhetoric surrounding comparable issues throughout Europe. 22. Only about 2% of population identified itself as Silesian and 0.6% as Kashub in 2011 according to Central Statistical Office of Poland (2011). The German minority, about 0.6% of the Polish population, is exempt from the electoral threshold of 5% to facilitate electoral representation. Upper Silesia enjoyed brief autonomy in the interwar period (Dembinska, 2012) , including the collection of taxes and public fees, with only a share (determined based on a formula) of taxes going to the central government for national services (Bialasiewicz, 2002) but no similar arrangements were made in post-war period for any region. 23. The Silesian Autonomy Movement has run candidates in local elections, organizes an annual Autonomy March, and initiated a petition gathering approximately 124,000 signatures for the recognition of Silesians as an ethnic group. The Kashub claims are mostly centered on cultural issues. 24. Quota sampling is a widely used sampling technique which requires interviews to fill a quota of respondent specific attitudes by certain classifying variables. For more on random-quota sampling, see Smith (1983) . Taylor Nelson Sofres (TNS) Global uses random-quota sampling based on geographic location. Due to the high correlation in Poland between geography and other potential moderating variables such as income and political ideology this sampling technique helps ensure balance on these important covariates. 25. We present heterogeneous treatment effects depending on whether we specify the bombing to have occurred in a foreign country in Figure A1 in the Appendix. 26. For an overview of the application of Structural Topic Models (STMs) to political science, see Lucas et al. (2015) and Roberts et al. (2014) . 27. Latent Dirichlet Allocation is a mixed-membership model where each document is represented as a mixture over a set of topics (Blei, 2012; Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 2003) . Each topic is a distribution over the words in the vocabulary which is learned, rather than assumed, in the model. 28. In contrast, when using "supervised" methods, the researcher defines the topics before analysis by hand-coding a set of documents into predefined categories. For a prominent introduction to supervised learning in political science, see Hopkins and King (2010) . 29. The results of the STM are similar after excluding responses from individuals reading about an organization using the tactic of a demonstration from the baseline category. 30. The stopword list was customized to include additional uninformative but frequently occurring Polish words. The words were not stemmed as available textanalysis tools so far do not support Polish. 31. As specified in the pre-analysis plan, we leave the exploration of potential heterogeneous treatment effects to future research. 32. We chose to run a model with three topics after estimating the model varying number of topics (k) from 3 to 10 and a substantive interpretation of the results of each specification. Three to 10 topics are recommended as a useful starting range for survey experiments because of a low variety in the content of responses given to a focused question and we found that in our case, models with a number of topics higher than three produced less readily interpretable topics. 33. We present top words for each topic in Polish and English in Table A1 in the  Appendix. 34. We use the simplified frequency-exclusivity scoring (FREX), which summarizes words with the harmonic mean of the probability of appearance under a topic and the exclusivity to that topic, providing the most semantically intuitive representation of topics (Roberts et al., 2014) . 35. As a validation step, we also examined exemplar documents for each topic which included responses with the highest proportion of words drawn from the topic.
